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Implications of External Memory for Investigations of Mind 
PAULA T. HERTEL 
Trinity University, San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. 
SUMMARY 
External memory-records of experiences that are maintained in repositories that are external 
to their users-provides context for many everyday cognitive acts. Some initial research has 
shown that such context influences learning, remembering, and judgements of knowing. The 
scope of both basic and applied memory research should be broadened in ways that address 
issues about the interaction of external memory and mind. 
[M]uch of our everyday knowledge resides in the world, 
not in the head. 
(Norman, 1988, p. ix) 
With this claim, Norman means to imply that we use aspects of our everyday environ­
ment in much the same way that we use mental knowledge, and that the two sources 
of knowledge interact in ways that have important effects on our current experience. 
Norman was primarily concerned with how we make use, effectively or ineffectively, 
of everyday things (e.g. doors, video controls, computers) by way of the knowledge 
they directly convey. Rather than examining the use of things, I focus on the impli­
cations of external knowledge for the use of mind. Like uses of things, uses of mind 
are rarely invoked in impoverished spaces such as the cognitive laboratory, but 
often occur in knowledge-rich settings such as the modern office. Moreover, in every­
day spaces people use not just their minds but also their external memory: records 
of past experiences that are maintained in repositories that are external to their 
users. 
Acts of remembering, for example, typically involve both internal and external 
memory, although one type may receive emphasis. Consider the rare case of the 
expert storyteller or shaman, who needs at least a cultural milieu or perhaps even 
a message stick to produce his tale (Hunter, 1979; Wallace and Rubin, 1991). At 
the other, more commonplace extreme, consider the researcher who remembers the 
results of her experiments by accessing a computer file; to retrieve what she needs 
from the file she must use linguistic, statistical, and computer skills from internal 
memory. This interaction of physical and mental records is sometimes acknowledged 
in the design of external repositories (Landauer, 1987) or 'cognitive artifacts' (Nor-
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man, 1991 ). Such thoughtfulness is illustrated by the growing literature on software 
and menu design, as this should be guided by our knowledge of human cognition 
(Barnard, 1987; Norman, 1991 ). In constructing our mental 'repositories' (in theories 
of mind), however, we pay much less attention to external memory. We are beginning 
to take the mind into account in designing the world, but not the world into account 
in studying the mind. This is true in spite of the exponential rate at which external 
memory has grown and must be used to learn and remember in the last few decades­
the 'information age'. Can current cognitive theories address adequately the fact 
that cognitive acts occur in information-rich environments, or must they be revised 
to answer questions posed from the perspective of the office worker? 
The purpose of this article is to consider a few implications of external memory 
for the use of mind. In particular, I describe research and speculations about whether 
the presence of external stores are helpful or detrimental to the mental acts of! earning, 
remembering, and judging knowledge. But first I explain what I mean by the term 
'external memory' and describe some of its relevant dimensions. 
EXTERNAL MEMORY 
Just where does knowledge reside if not in the mind? Some of the more common 
repositories are books, computer and other office files, technical manuals, notes 
and lists, diaries, and the minds of other people. Certainly among the more interesting 
examples of external memory is Faraday's set of diaries and accompanying retrieval 
aids (Tweney, 1992). These repositories become external memories only through 
our encounters with them. My colleagues' computer files (and minds) certainly repre­
sent information, but they do not serve as my external memory unless, of course, 
I am given access. This idea is not new to modern cognitive psychology. Among 
others, Hunter ( 1979) implied that external repositories, which he called 'external 
aids', increase our knowledge through personal interaction. 
The 'Space' of External Memory Research 
Usually, when we think about external aids, such devices as strings around the finger 
come to mind (although no one actually seems to use them). Other examples are 
lists of things to do, usually containing short phrases that few other people could 
decipher (e.g. call HERR about PAM). These aids are clearly intended to be memory 
cues rather than repositories of knowledge. Indeed, we could conceive of a continuum 
that represents the extent to which the physical record recapitulates the event to 
be remembered. At one extreme is a mere fragment of the entire event to be remem­
bered. A string is tied around a finger during a thought about a prospective event 
and remains to cue the procedure. At the other extreme, in theory, lies a complete 
record of the event (although duplication is impossible in practice). Close to this 
extreme, for example, is the record of an experiment published in a journal, or 
the videotape of a birthday party. Between the two extremes events can be placed 
according to the completeness of the record. Lecture notes record at least some 
of what the lecturer said. 
Other continua can be incorporated into the problem space of external memory 
research. Johnson and Raye's ( 1981) distinction between externally and internally 
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generated (internal) memories can be extended to external records; clearly, the extent 
to which such a record has been generated by oneself or by others should have 
interesting implications for how its physical existence might affect mental acts. 
Further, the distinction between declarative and procedural knowledge might also 
inform effects from external memories. Herrmann and Petro's (1990) appendum of 
commercial memory aids includes several that function to store procedures rather 
than 'facts' (e.g. the hand calculator). The pills placed by the coffee pot or lecture 
notes by the office door also represent procedures, but they record the procedure 
only partially Uust as a note on a lecture only partially records the full declaration). 
Therefore, a taxonomy of external memory might use the three-dimensional problem 
space of completeness of the record, source of its generation, and type of knowledge 
(procedural versus declarative). However, the portion of the problem space devoted 
to relatively complete external records is the current focus, because cognitive research 
habitually addresses the effects of partial cues (e.g. semantically or graphemically 
related words). I also emphasize declarative knowledge. (A portion of prospective 
memory research takes up issues in procedural knowledge, externally represented; 
see Kvavilashvili, 1992). 
Finally, any treatment of the implications of external memory for the study of 
mind must also include a plethora of mental distinctions. Schoenpflug's (1986, 1988) 
research on decisions about whether to memorize text or to store it in computer 
files reminds us that the existence and nature of external devices can affect learning 
as well as remembering (or study as well as test). Moreover, in considering the 
lack of attention to external memory in cognitive research, one might find the study 
of attention to these devices per se to be a fruitful exploration. Do external memories 
affect cognitive procedures to a greater extent when we are more or less aware of 
them? The study of automatic compared to controlled influences of external memory 
might augment similar distinctions regarding the effects of past experience on current 
mental acts (see Jacoby, 1991). 
Characteristics of external memories 
Ironically, external memories have been considered in the construction of cognitive 
theory, in contrast to my previous claim. From Plato's wax tablet, to Broadbent's 
library, and Atkinson and Shiffrin's computer, they have provided the metaphors 
that guide the study of mind (Roediger, 1980). External devices are structural by 
nature, in that they occupy space in ways that the mind does not. Perhaps because 
these external repositories are structured in certain ways we have sometimes reasoned 
that the mind is similarly structured. Alternatively such external structures might 
be reflections of our own mentation of similarities and differences (Bower, 1970, 
pp. 41-42). We construct external devices in ways that make them useful to minds 
that work according to these principles. As an aid to future intentional use, for 
example, we organize our external memories because we understand something about 
the effects of organization on retrieval. Regardless, both types of repositories 'encode' 
similarity and difference; they appear to be organized (or not). 
Organization is often conceived in semantic and lexical terms (e.g. bookshelves 
are arranged by topics and then alphabetically by surname), but both external and 
internal memories encode episodes as well. Things that co-occur in time and space 
are associated in external records; photo albums are an obvious example. Thus, 
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the degree of external organization, because it is a shared attribute, should affect 
cognitive acts of memory. Similarly, sensory characteristics of external records should 
be important, because to the extent that we also remember them they may determine 
where we search (Lansdale, 1991 ). 
According to Norman (1988, p. 79), characteristics of external and internal know­
ledge establish tradeoff's in the choice of which to use. Aesthetic value, for example, 
might guide the choice of where to place one's knowledge; some things should not 
be seen. More importantly, perhaps, every repository is characterized by the degree 
of effort required for its use. Surely this procedural characteristic-and perhaps 
many others-has vast implications for normal acts of learning and remembering 
in the presence of external memory. 
INTERACTIONS OF MIND AND EXTERNAL MEMORY 
Effects on learning and remembering 
Watkins (1990) and many others have addressed the fallacy in believing that we 
can separately examine the cognitive acts of learning and remembering-a fallacy 
attributable to the use of such spatial metaphors as storage and retrieval for mental 
phenomena. Yet cognitive procedures (however they are understood) might indeed 
by affected by the real acts of storing in and retrieving from external memory. Under 
what conditions do people eschew study in favour of external storage and rely on 
external memory for remembering, rather than mind? 
Decisions to store knowledge externally depend not only on the nature of that 
knowledge but on assumptions about the relative ease of learning or storing and 
of remembering or retrieving. Schoenptlug (1986) viewed these matters in economic 
terms in performing a cost-benefit analysis of the trade-off between learning texts 
and storing them in computer files. For external knowledge to be effective in later 
tasks (e.g. writing a paper), both its location and its gist must also be learned. Conse­
quently, there is no point in storing very simple records externally. Schoenptlug's 
subjects often chose to memorize the texts, except when the file name (location) 
matched the gist of the text. 
Schoenpflug's findings contrast somewhat with common beliefs about everyday 
decisions to rely on external aids over mind. In examining such beliefs, Intons­
Peterson and Fournier (1986) found that college students prefer external devices 
such as lists and maps to internal processes such as rehearsal and imagery (see also 
Harris, 1980). Compared to mind, the students thought that external devices were 
more dependable, accurate, and user-friendly, in general. This disparity between 
students' beliefs and the behaviour of Schoenpflug's subjects might reflect differences 
in the type and amount of information to be stored or learned. The students' external 
preference was stronger for storing procedure rather than declarations, for example, 
and for storing spatial rather than verbal information. More importantly, perhaps, 
the students' general beliefs about the greater ease of using external memory might 
ignore the lack of flexibility inherent in many external stores. Like computer files, 
lists and maps must be readily available if they are to be useful-that is, unless 
the maker and the user of the external record is the same person, in which case, 
the mere making of the record is an aid to learning; consider research on notetaking. 
Research in educational psychology has shown that taking notes on lectures facili-
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tates subsequent cognitive performances, regardless of the availability of the notes 
at the time of the test (see Einstein, Morris and Smith, 1985, for a review). Lists 
of things to do probably function similarly. Again, in these examples the user of 
the external record is also its creator, and so the record is doubly made. And, as 
is the case with internally generated memories, self-generated records might come 
to mind easily and thereby influence judgements about external aids. For example, 
when Intons-Peterson and Fournier's ( 1986) subjects judged the advantages of storing 
information externally, they perhaps thought more often about the records they 
had created, and remembered that they were useful. In this way availability heuristics 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1973) might operate to mislead us about the real advantages 
and disadvantages of external storage. Plainly, such issues deserve to be pursued 
in the course of investigating the effects of external stores on decisions to learn. 
Little is understood about the effects of external memory alternatives to learning, 
but much less is known about their influences on remembering. Some years ago 
Estes ( 1980) expressed the concern that external devices might reduce memory skills, 
and Estes is far from the first to do so (Plato, 1985, p. 520). Examples of this fear 
abound in the folk culture of the academy; our students' calculators and spell-checkers 
have made them forget how to multiply and spell, for example. In this context, 
Hertel and Holamon ( 1993) began to examine memory effects associated with the 
availability of external stores. 
Hertel and Holamon asked college students to study obscure historical facts, each 
of which expressed the name of someone who accomplished a feat, the accomplish­
ment, and its location (e.g. 'Pierre Reverdy wrote moralist poems in Narbonne'). 
Index cards, each containing one of the studied facts, were stored in a file box. 
Then the file box served as the subjects' external memory while they attempted to 
remember the names in response to being cued by accomplishments. For the present 
purpose, two experimental manipulations in an unreported pilot study were import­
ant. First, before the study phase, some subjects were told that the file would be 
available during testing whereas others were not. Second, half of each study condition 
was allowed to use the file on the test whereas the other half was not. We expected 
that each manipulation would affect the number of names truly recalled, but we 
were wrong. Regardless of study conditions, subjects recalled 30 per cent of the 
names, on average, when they were not allowed access and 34 per cent when they 
were (but before they searched the file). Although this difference was not reliable, 
its direction defies the expectation that people will rely on external devices for retrieval 
to the detriment of their own memory. 
The main purpose of the experiments reported by Hertel and Holamon ( 1993) 
was to investigate the effects of the presence versus absence of the external memory 
on the number of facts recalled (before search or with search not allowed). A variety 
of file and cueing conditions were used. In one condition, for example, the facts 
in the file box were organized according to the type of accomplishment (art, music, 
literature, or science), and name recall was cued by the specific accomplishment 
(e.g. 'wrote moralistic poems'). The main finding in both experiments was that the 
subjects recalled more facts when the file was opened and placed on the table than 
when it was absent. In the latter case, the subjects were either reminded orally of 
the types of accomplishments (Experiment 1) or they were allowed to inspect a piece 
of paper that listed the types (Experiment 2). Regardless, the presence of the actual 
file produced a recall advantage. Of course, many issues remain to be addressed, 
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not the least of which is whether the results extend to more naturalistic and applied 
settings. For the present purpose, however, they illustrate the fallacy of assuming 
that external stores are bad for the mind. 
Effects on judgements of knowing 
Before the recall phase in the experiments just described, the subjects estimated 
the number of facts they knew. The estimates were performed in the same condition 
as was recall-either with the file present or absent-and they produced the same 
general finding. The presence of the file incurred higher estimates; subjects not only 
knew more but also realized it. This outcome, however, is just part of the story. 
For example, the effect of the file's presence on estimates was found only when 
the facts had been studied in mixed order. When they were studied in organized 
clusters, a reminder of the organization was sufficient to produce good estimates. 
Further, one can easily imagine situations in which external memory makes us feel 
smarter than we are. Having skimmed the abstracts in the latest issue of a professional 
journal, we might place it on the shelf with some confidence in 'having' knowledge. 
Our students may not know how to take a square root but probably, in some sense, 
believe that they do because they have a square-root key. Methods for pursuing 
such intuitions in research domains might draw from those developed by Nelson 
and his colleagues (Krinsky and Nelson, 1985) to study feeling-of-knowing and 
related judgements. 
Offices provide a rich setting for applied research on external memory's connection 
to cognitive phenomena (Christie, 1985). Perhaps nowhere else can we expect such 
large 'natural' variation in both the size and the organizational state of external 
memory. Several years ago I conducted a survey of faculty across all academic disci­
plines at Trinity University (Hertel, 1988). Participants were first asked to rate their 
confidence in knowing about their research domain. Subsequently, I requested mea­
sures of external memory, such as amount (books and office files measured in feet), 
estimates of the percentage read, and degree of organization. Although measures 
of the amount and the percentage read gave a reliable prediction of confidence 
in knowledge, a measure of current organization was the best predictor, allowing 
for the other relationships. The most confident faculty had more external memory, 
had read a larger portion of it, but most of all kept it organized. Of course, in 
applied research we cannot know about the direction of the relationships between 
measures of external memory and cognitive phenomena. One might imagine, for 
example, that the more confident faculty might collect more material and, perhaps 
accurately, claim to have read more of it. Less clear, however, is the relationship 
between organization and confidence. It might be the case that organization is a 
by-product of confidence, but busy people often do not take the time to put everything 
away. These findings therefore suggest that physical boundaries of knowledge blur 
when one is judging knowledge. 
Consequences of feeling knowledgeable 
If 'having knowledge' turns out to be so ambiguous a term and misleading a state 
as I suggest, then a variety of consequences might be expected. When we feel knowl­
edgeable, for example, are we not appropriately sceptical about the knowledge we 
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convey? Or does the feeling of knowing point directly to the correct and sometimes 
external source? Johnson and Raye's ( 1981) research on the origin of internal memor­
ies provides reason to suspect that source knowledge is often incomplete and inaccur­
ate. Yet, in contrast to the source of mental memories, source can be made plain 
in the external realm. 
One of my very confident colleagues has an office neatly full of external memories 
that are elaborately cross-referenced for multiple purposes. Another colleague's office 
literally appears as if it were struck by a tornado. Posted on this colleague's door 
(in both warning and self-defence) is a clipping that describes Lansdale's work on 
Memoirs, a computerized system that works much like piles of papers in a messy 
office (Under the volcano, 1992). Lansdale's analysis of messy offices stresses the 
rich contextual cues for location that are often absent from view in the tidy office. 
Perhaps this colleague is well aware that much of his knowledge is to be found 
outside his head. 
In a different vein, confidence in knowledge is related to a general sense of well­
being, especially for those who study or work in information-rich environments. 
To investigate the possible mediators of this assumed relationship, Anooshian, Ash­
brook, and Hertel ( 1985) asked college students to complete a questionnaire about 
their experiences in remembering. Modelled loosely on Herrmann's ( 1982) memory 
inventory, the questionnaire requested ratings of agreement with several statements 
about general memory functions (e.g. 'In general, I believe I have a good memory') 
and several more specific statements about types of retrieval cues (e.g. 'When trying 
to remember something, I have an easier time when I happen to be thinking about 
something that is meaningfully connected to what I want to remember'). The subjects 
were categorized as newcomers to San Antonio-having arrived within the past 
2 or 3 weeks-or residents for at least 1 year. Residents rated their general memory 
functions higher than did newcomers. Further, the residents' ratings of their general 
memory ability were related positively to a subsequent measure of self-confidence 
(or self-esteem). The newcomers, however, provided the more interesting data. Rather 
than general beliefs about their memory ability, awareness of the benefits of spatial 
cues (and not other types) predicted their level of self-confidence. Newcomers ex­
perience less self-confidence when they tended not to believe that physical context 
is an important factor in remembering. Anooshian et a!. ( 1985) suggested that those 
who were aware of such benefits could attribute their cognitive difficulties to the 
new environment rather than to their own lack of ability. 
For the present purpose, the study of relocated and stable students suggests that 
external memory might function like physical location, not just to cue recall, but 
to maintain confidence in knowledge and general feelings of worth. Also, these find­
ings possibly extend to relocations of other types, such as changes in residence by 
older people who face the prospect of losing large segments of external memory 
when they move to small apartments or nursing centers (see Anooshian, Mamarella 
and Hertel, 1989). Similarly, recently divorced or separated people lose the sense 
of personal history that resides partly in the mind of the departing spouse; regardless 
of mood, they believe that their memory ability is worse (Hertel, 1985; Wegner, 
Giuliano, and Hertel, 1985). 
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CONCLUSIONS 
In discussing the contextuai dependency and flexibility of mind, Landauer (1987, 
p. 2 1) said it well: 'Since the mind does not have any set natural habitat, we need 
to study it in the habitats in which it frequently finds or wishes to find itself. This 
essay has suggested that external memory, as part of the mind's natural habitat, 
influences whether we learn, how much we remember, and how much we think 
we know. I have used the term 'external memory' to refer to external records of 
experience. A broader view has been taken by Norman (1991), who addressed the 
role performed by a variety of cognitive artifacts�artificial devices that enhance 
cognitive ability. That role, simplified, is to change the nature of the cognitive tasks 
people perform. The question for memory researchers, then, is whether our current 
understanding of learning and memory applies in knowledge-rich environments, 
where metacognitive decisions and cognitive artifacts might change the nature of 
what it means to remember. Further, this question�crucially�might not be answered 
adequately by simply incorporating external devices into the design of the research. 
Other aspects of its design also pertain to the issue of applicability. Consider the 
research by Hertel and Holamon ( 1993). 
Hertel and Holamon's experiments were typical laboratory studies of estimates 
of knowledge and accuracy of recall, with the added feature of external devices. 
The demands of the task included a request to learn a number of historical facts 
in a concentrated period of time and then to perform on tests of cued recall, also 
in a concentrated time period. This set of demands perhaps comes close to last-minute 
cramming for a memory-oriented test in a course on cultural history, but not much 
else. 
To discover if the advantage of having an external memory would hold up in 
more naturalistic settings, we might use distributed study sessions that permit 
decisions about whether to learn or to store and distributed and shortened tests 
of both feelings of knowing and actual recall or retrieval. Then we (like Schoenpflug, 
1986) might indeed discover that performance depends on the decision about where 
to store and to search and that those decisions might depend importantly on economy 
of effort. This research design would be much higher in ecological validity, but 
due to typical components of experimental control it might not tell us much about 
what people do in normal working conditions, in which external memory functions 
meaningfully rather than arbitrarily. For example, simulating expertise in the sense 
of external memory would surely be difficult. Applied research could question the 
findings established by the controlled experiment, or it could supply converging 
evidence. The results of the faculty survey (Hertel, 1988), for example, partly converge 
with the findings from the laboratory; faculty confidence was positively correlated 
with the amount and organization of external memory. 
Herrmann and Gruneberg's ( 1993, this issue) point, as I take it, is to advise memory 
researchers to confront the logical and methodological difficulties associated with 
lack of control in order to ask important questions about how memory operates 
in the real world. Plainly, the real world is full of external memory, and people 
are constrained by time and cognitive limitations to use it. Memory researchers 
must not merely acknowledge these constraints, but should inquire about their inter­
actions with mental phenomena and thereby broaden the scope of questions that 
we pose. 
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